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ABSTRACT
Development of future manufacturing systems is featured with flexibility, mass customization, 
intelligence and context based learning to produce smart products. These production systems are 
characterized through networked, cooperating objects called cyber physical systems (CPSs). From 
the manufacturing perspective, the ability to communicate data and develop interaction between 
devices, manufacturing machinery, raw materials, working robots, humans and the plant environ-
ment develops the concept of cyber physical production systems (CPPS). Human-robot collabora-
tion is a technology area that will be an integrated part of the future factory floor and the CPPS. 
With the involvement of human part in the automated system industrial scenarios, practical safety 
issues are expected to arise in the connected environment due to the use of a large number of 
devices, sensors, and cloud services causing complex network, IP conflicts, compromised nodes 
and communication issues. This all may lead to occupational safety issues on the factory floor in 
different ways and combinations. Overall, the system’s physical vulnerability will be increased in 
the context of compromised connected working space and cyber-security. In this paper, the 
authors developed a risk assessment based on system vulnerability of a CPPS developed for 
a use case requirement and performed a simulated approach by launching a cyber-attack and 
measuring the causal effect to identify implications on human worker safety.
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1 Introduction
System flexibility is the key in the future manufactur-
ing systems to deliver flexibility in products, generally 
known as mass customization. Many new technology 
domains are being integrated in manufacturing to 
support such systems, which include Internet of 
things (IoT), cloud computing, sensor networks, 
cyber physical systems and big data analytics 
(Gonçalves, de Araujo, and Corazzim 2020). The mer-
ger of these ICT technologies in manufacturing 
enables the system to predict properties in operation, 
maintenance, product design variation and logistics 
(Zhang, Yan, and Zhenghua 2020). These futuristic 
systems are proposed for system flexibility enabling 
high productivity of customized products and further 
technology areas to evolve in the umbrella of Industry 
4.0. Advanced robotics is also an integrated technol-
ogy in the future manufacturing systems in which the 
flexibility of artificial intelligence and positioning 
accuracy of the robots can be beneficial for the 
industrial manufacturing systems (Thames and 
Schaefer 2017). For this reason, the workspace envel-
ope of robots is expected to rise in future smart 
factories. These self-learning, self-decision-making 
manufacturing systems and robots may limit the 
future industrial roles for the humans to some extent. 
It does not mean that the human absence is the 
future of the manufacturing systems. Human pre-
sence would be inevitable but is restricted to super-
visory roles on the shop floor working closely with the 
robotic counterparts (Khalid and Khan 2014). This has 
lead to the evolution of technologies like human- 
robot collaboration (HRC) in an industrial scenario. 
Many industrial robot developers have already built 
collaborative robots or cobots with flexible capabil-
ities to support manufacturing tasks.
There are almost one million non-collaborative 
robots installed in the industry worldwide (Knight 
2014). Replacement of present-day conventional 
robots with the newly developed cobots needs 
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a huge amount of investment by the manufacturing 
industry (Khan, Khalid, and Iqbal 2018). On the other 
side, new manufacturing processes or assembly lines 
can easily be designed to work with cobots and pos-
sess a lot of revenue potential for cobot manufac-
turers (Stadnicka and Antonelli 2019). In order to 
save the huge replacement cost, there is 
a development opportunity to transform the conven-
tional robots into intelligent cobots using the inte-
grated working environment of the interconnected 
sensor network, communication system, data fusion 
and other technologies (Ore et al. 2020). However, 
due to worker safety issues, the transformation of 
conventional robots to cobots is more feasible in 
small and medium scale payload robots (Weippl and 
Kieseberg 2017). In order to develop such an inter-
connected system, a cyber physical system (CPS) is 
envisaged to incorporate requirements of sensors, 
safety, security, communication and electronics. It is 
noted that successful transformation in medium scale 
robotics will trigger research effort in the case of 
heavy payload robots to enable collaborative tasks 
(Khalid et al. 2016; Lasota, Rossano, and Shah 2014).
There are many cobot examples that are devel-
oped to work with human workers and have appro-
priate safety certifications (Knight 2014; Collaborative 
Robotics Market Exceeds US$1 Billion by 2015). These 
are mostly medium payload (0.5 to 14 kg) cobots 
developed for mobile phone and electronics manu-
facturing. The regular features of the cobots are 
human worker avoidance, speed reduction upon vio-
lation of workspace, collision detection and instant 
hold upon collision and the programmable compli-
ance that they can be trained quickly for different jobs 
on the shop floor (Tsarouchi et al. 2017). There are 
safety and protection measures that need to be 
implemented for a cobot-human shared work cell 
according to the ISO 15066–2016 (ISO 2016). 
However, the safety and security (protection) require-
ments in the case of heavy payload cobotics are still in 
the infancy stage (Prinsloo, Sinha, and Basie von 
2019). Human robot collaboration (HRC) is discussed 
in (Stadnicka and Antonelli 2019), but no safety/secur-
ity aspect is analyzed, in case of fault. Similarly, in 
another research, body gestures are utilized for HRC 
in an automotive assembly line jointly instrumented 
by robots and humans assuming fault-free scenario 
(Tsarouchi et al. 2017).
The present research focuses on the development 
of CPS in which conventional robots or cobots are 
connected with the intelligent manufacturing envir-
onment. Together with the other intelligent plant 
modules, the cyber physical production system 
(CPPS) (Khalid and Khan 2014; Pirvu, Zamfirescu, and 
Gorecky 2016; Monostori 2014) is composed of the 
necessary communication and sensor network, the 
cyber component (CC), physical component (PC) and 
the human component (HC). The HC integration is an 
extension in the initial conceptual framework of CPPS 
in which different adaptors (HMI technologies, ges-
ture control, tracking sensors) have made it possible 
for production employees to be part of the CPPS 
(Uhlemann, Thomas, Lehmann, and Steinhilper 
2017). In the future manufacturing systems, there 
will be a seamless integration of humans and 
machines and passive safety fencing will be removed 
(see Figure 1). The increased level of connectivity in 
future manufacturing systems (CPPS) will affect the 
concepts of safety and security. Safety and security 
(Plósz, Schmittner, and Varga 2017) are both system 
level properties and must be considered concurrently. 
As safety physically protects humans from the sys-
tems, the security essentially protects the systems 
from humans as attackers (Rehman et al. 2020). Cyber- 
Figure 1. Human–robot interaction in cyber-physical work environments.
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attacks as a safety threat in joint tasking by a human 
co-worker and cobot in the present framework is 
a novel analysis for the assessment of vulnerability 
in CPPS. This analysis will be helpful in ensuring relia-
bility in future automated industrial manufacturing.
In this paper, the objective is to systematically 
identify the risk sources and highlight hazards from 
the integrated safety and security aspects. The 
considered heavy payload robot is installed in an 
automobile manufacturing plant as a vital physical 
module and works intelligently by developing an 
external CPPS that enables it to exhibit HRC. The 
outcome of the paper may contribute towards the 
development of future HRC capable of integrated 
manufacturing systems in the context of Industry 
4.0. The next section of the paper introduces a use 
case of an assembly scenario in the automobile 
industry proposed for an active HRC. The third 
section explores the CPPS model for the use-case 
and the technology requirements according to the 
designed framework. The fourth section investi-
gates risks based on the integrated concepts of 
safety and security in a CPPS. Section 5 considers 
the simulation benchmark based on KUKA youBot 
and two-conveyor platform to study the system 
vulnerabilities based on the identified risks due to 
cyber-attack resulting in compromised safety and 
failure issues. Section 6 concludes the discussion 
and findings.
2. Use case
Traditional work environments lack the ability to 
respond intelligently to adapted processes and there-
fore do not allow dynamic modifications. While this 
leads to new and improved ways of interaction and 
collaboration, it places challenges on safety and pro-
tection systems. Contemporary protection systems 
separating the worker from the machine (e.g. through 
safety fences; see Figure 3) pose a serious limitation 
for realizing an efficient HRC. Context-based systems 
are required, which have to provide active, integrated 
and omnipresent protection for the human worker. 
The CPPS work environment needs real time adapta-
tion to situations and working conditions. This is an 
active protection concept in addition to the passive 
protection of injury avoiding construction of robots 
and machines.
As a representative industrial HRC scenario, an assembly 
process from the automotive industry is chosen, as shown in 
Figure 2, where the workspace of an industrial robot and 
a human worker substantially overlap. The tasks are related 
to the assembly of motors and gear drives. Under considera-
tion of customer requirements, several potential assembly 
scenarios were identified. These were analyzed according to 
qualitative criteria and weighting and thus were narrowed 
to eight scenarios. The eight scenarios were subject to a task 
and cost analysis in order to highlight which of the processes 
possess the highest economic potential.
In this manner, a semi-automatic assembly process 
focusing on motor and gear drive assembly is chosen.
Figure 2. The assembly scenario (courtesy of thyssenkrupp 
System Engineering).
Figure 3. Conventional heavy payload robot as PC in CPPS 
(passive safety measures to be removed).
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The main advantage of this particular process lies 
in the fact that the type and sequence of the tasks 
significantly comprised of the generalized assembly 
processes in manufacturing. This process is an exemp-
lary HRC reference scenario, which is based upon the 
semi-automatic assembly of the seal ring upon an 
automobile motor. A heavy payload robot with 
a gripper lifts a motor from a workpiece carrier. The 
motor is then forwarded to the assembly worker and 
presented in an ergonomically convenient position. 
The task of the assembly worker consists of screwing 
on a seal ring on the front end of the motor with 
a pneumatic screwdriver. This process step can be 
considered as the intermediate HRC (Khalid et al. 
2016), since the working areas of the assembly worker 
and the robot overlap synchronously. The robot is 
supposed to reduce its speed in the presence of 
trackable production employees and present the 
workpiece to the worker for further operation. Table 
1 shows the detailed operation sequence of the repre-
sentative scenario. Figure 4 shows the phase wise HRC 
identification for better understanding of the process. 
It is clear that HRC is exhibiting at two collaborative 
phases (T5, T7) out of the 11 phases marked as sepa-
rate activities in the process.
3. Cyber physical production system model
To develop an effective HRC system, a continuous 
speed or distance monitoring between the human 
and robot is a way that is combined with the context 
of the work setup. From this industrial assembly sce-
nario, technical measures can be derived for the 
appropriate behaviour of HRC safety systems. It 
became evident that the minimum safety distance 
within the HRC scenario should be incorporated 
when choosing the appropriate CPPS components 
(Khalid et al. 2017). It has been shown that the inte-
gration of virtual commissioning (VC) for CPS-based 
HRC is an excellent complimentary technique for 
accompanying the realization of HRC safety concepts 
and thus for evaluating the functional-safety and 
interoperability of CPPS components. However, 
there is a need of more sophisticated data models 
for describing and visualizing the behaviour of 
a CPPS-based industrial scenario. For example, the 
integration of real sensor data from motion tracking 
systems is possible in visualization tools, which are 
suitable for VC. In this respect, it has to be noted that 
in HRC settings, the HC is a vital part of the CPPS in 
addition to the other technical components.
In the basic CPS definition, [shown in Figure 5(a)], it 
is evident that it is a smart system in which the 
computational and physical systems are integrated 
to control and sense the changing state of real- 
world variables (Sunder 2012). However, the 
extended CPPS concept [shown in Figure 5(b)] 
involves the vital HC interaction with other compo-
nents of the CPPS to exhibit HRC. There are certain 
adaptor technologies playing an important role 
between the main components of the CPPS. These 
adaptors work according to the industrial scenario 
Table 1. Detailed phases of the assembly scenario.
No. Operation sequence
1 Workpiece in the workpiece carrier is moved discontinuously on the 
conveyor belt and moved to the default position.
2 Robot removes the workpiece from the workpiece carrier by 
clutching it with gripper.
3 Robot moves the workpiece into the assembly position.
4 Workman removes the assembly component cover from the default 
position.
5 Workman positions the assembly component cover on to the 
workpiece.
6 Workman removes assembly component screws at the default 
position and moves them to the assembly position.
7 Workman mounts the assembly component screw on the assembly 
component cover and workpiece.
8 Robot moves the assembled workpiece to the pneumatic screw 
driver.
9 Pneumatic screw driver tightens (screws on) the assembly 
component cover and assembly component screw to the 
workpiece.
10 Robot moves the workpiece to the workpiece carrier and gripper 
declamps the assembled workpiece.
11 Robot moves to the default position.
Figure 4. The assembly scenario – phase-wise HRC identification.
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requirement. Figure 6 shows different adaptor tech-
nologies in order to work out the safe HRC. For 
instance, a human worker is equipped with a body 
suit and helmet that comprised of the motion track-
ing devices.
A physical research demonstrator of this HRC 
representative scenario has been implemented with 
off-the-shelf components. The demonstrator consists 
of a heavy payload robot from FANUC (R-2000iB 
165 F), a robot controller (R30iA), an industrial PC 
(Siemens) with ProfiNet/ProfiSafe interfaces, as well 
as two safety laser scanners (SICK S3000), two HD 
cameras and a wearable 3D motion capturing system. 
The concept of the demonstrator relies upon a sensor 
framework, which enables the ad-hoc integration of 
potential cyber-physical components, whereas the 
sensor data is collected and sensor fusion takes 
place in the environment of the industrial-PC. The 
laser scanner detects the human presence in the 
robot cell, whereas the two overhead HD cameras 
cover the visual surveillance of the cell. The human 
worker signature is recorded by the inertial measure-
ment unit (IMU) fitted bodysuit, which is a must wear-
able in this case and communicates data wirelessly to 
the server. For this purpose, the hardware compo-
nents such as PLC and sensors are coupled with the 
simulation environment (hardware-in-the-loop), and 
robot control and sensor data are used within the 
simulation for safety distance computation, imple-
mentation of human avoidance algorithm and speed 
reduction upon detection, thereby controlling the 
system through the cyber component of the CPPS.
Moreover, to verify the industrial HRC scenario in 
the case study, i.e. only phase numbers 5 and 7 in 
Figure 4, the virtual commissioning is carried out to 
test the effectiveness of human avoidance algorithms 
Figure 5. (a) Basic CPS definition. (b) CPPS framework for HRC (legend given is common).
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based on the real time safety distance calculations. 
Figure 7 shows a visualization window for the assem-
bly process and to study safety issues in real time. It is 
clear from the sequence of operation that a semi- 
collaborative process is followed in which a heavy 
workpiece block is presented to the production 
employee for further installation of small items on 
the block. It is necessary for the robot to hold the 
workpiece for the complete duration of the task and 
put it back safely to the initial position after the task is 
finished. The system also has manual control adjust-
ments as the robot position is locked in that case for 
Figure 6. HRC adaptor technologies involved for transforming conventional robots.
Figure 7. Demonstrator along with virtual commissioning visualization including sensors and communication protocol.
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an unlimited time unless the manual push button is 
triggered by the worker to start the next process 
sequence.
4. Risk identification
Factories of the Future (FOF) represent demonstrative 
infrastructures, which highlights the fourth industrial 
revolution strategy implied by ‘Industry 4.0’. These 
environments are characterized by interconnected 
cyber-physical components. These infrastructures 
provide technological challenges regarding security 
and interoperability and, additionally, foster new 
interaction opportunities for humans with equip-
ment, machines and tools. HRC is a descriptive para-
digm and comprises a manifold of technological 
challenges. As such, an increasing number of indus-
trial customers of this industrial domain dealing with 
automatic and semi-automatic assembly processes 
are highly interested in leveraging their assembly 
processes to a stage to enable seamless HRC.
The challenges related to an industrial HRC sce-
nario are manifold from a technical point of view 
but uniquely address the safety and security aspects. 
On one hand, the CPPS is designed to meet a single 
objective of ‘CPPS-safety’, but on the other hand, 
‘CPPS-security’ is also an equally vital issue to com-
prehend. Mitigation approaches for CPPS-security 
challenges seriously lack the ability to detect and 
actively react to the cyber-attack that can advance 
without restriction once the cyber layer is compro-
mised. Currently, all the development focus is on the 
design side of intelligent security cyber-attack that 
includes the penetration enhancement of such 
attacks through in-depth understanding of the target 
(CPS) control system (Tuptuk and Hailes 2018). 
Figure 8 shows a list of potential attack methods, 
targets, effects and interdependencies between the 
different CPPS layers.
A CPS possesses different system layers, and thus, 
potential attacks are executed at targets placed at 
diverse system layers. Due to the great amount of 
reliance and interdependencies amid CPPS compo-
nents at different strata, ancillary effects can follow 
at CPPS elements, which have not been openly con-
fronted. These prompted effects can happen at com-
ponents placed in diverse layers or even linking to 
different (cyber or physical) domains. Such cross-layer 
and cross-domain assaults on CPPS are very compli-
cated and hardly understood so far.
The selection of technology for the implementa-
tion of defined CPPS for HRC has many technical 
challenges. The biggest challenge is the computation 
of real time safety distance, which the robot must 
establish to avoid the human working in the produc-
tion cell. Tight specifications on saftey distance will be 
translated as the technology limit in terms of sensor 
specifications. Other challenges may include the use 
of reliable components to develop such a CPPS and 
a cyber security mitigation plan to counter intelligent 
cyber-attacks in the connected environment. This 
security plan must ensure the safe HRC and the secur-
ity of PC even in the case of a compromised cyber 
layer of the system.
To build on the human avoidance approach, the 
physical challenge is to cover all parts of the robot to 
avoid humans using the safety distance approach 
(Khalid et al. 2016), meaning that sensors need to be 
Insider Attack, unwitting behavior
Data and Policy Corruption
Code Manipulation, malware
Worms, viruses, flooding












Disruption of Operators Behaviour
Induces Inaccuracies and Failures




Cyber Attack Methods Targets Effects
Figure 8. Potential cyber attack methods, targets, effects, and interconnections between the CPS layers (Elder 2008).
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installed on multiple links and joints. Figure 9 shows 
the safety distance calculations with four technology 
component sensors selected for CPPS application. The 
data shows that camera systems are the slowest and 
hence need the largest safety distance. Also, 
increased human worker speed results in large safety 
distance. Additionally, the data delay rate of the indi-
vidual sensor output and communication over the 
network can cause undesirable results for HRC. 
Using multiple sensors from different makes can 
cause 120–150 ms delay using the present day sensor 
technology and requires sensor fusion techniques to 
reduce the delay time. The authors believe that the 
sensor fusion approach is more appropriate to reduce 
this delay instead of using only visual feedback (Islam 
et al. 2019).
A complete CPPS may have many sources of poten-
tial hazards due to which the system can malfunction 
and compromise on safe HRC. The list of these 
hazards can come from different sources. The three 
identified hazard sources are due to the collaborating 
robot, the industrial process, and the CPPS control 
layer malfunction. Detailed lists of hazards from 
these sources are given in Table 2.
All the three hazard sources are fully effective to 
those phases of the selected industrial senario in 
which the HRC is established in the use-case (see 
Figure 4). The hazards identified above can affect the 
HRC at any scale, as the focus in this work is on 
medium to heavy payload robots. The involved 
(hazards) variables at different magnitudes (low, med-
ium, high) during collaboration can be further studied 
to see the effects on the human worker health and 
safety, industrial process effectiveness, quality of colla-
boration and the safety and security of the collabora-
tive system. These domains can be further expanded 
to incorporate robustness in the HRC process.
5. Vulnerabilities in CPPS – A simulated study
The cyber-physical security challenges need to be 
addressed for successful collaborative tasking in the 
HRC segment. This requires access control to all inter-
connected devices in the CPPS. However, wireless 
networks are vulnerable to security threats, and 
secure communication protocols need to be utilized 
in order to ensure fault proof HRC. Moreover, in case 
an eavesdropper gains access to any component, the 
cyber security checks should act fast enough to miti-
gate the possible damage, as listed in Figure 8. It is 
challenging to counter zero day vulnerbilities (ZDV), 
which are unknown to the CPPS and can result in fatal 
consequences if not detected timely. On the other 
hand, most of the other types of cyber attacks have 
Figure 9. Safety distance versus human worker speed assessment on four different sensors.
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detectable signatures and their patterns are known to 
the security experts. For zero day vulnerabilities, com-
plex artificial intelligence and machine learning algo-
rithms are needed to detect and encounter these 
attacks (Wegner, Graham, and Ribble 2017; Khalid 
et al. 2018).
The VC scenario presented in Figure 7 is followed 
further for the simulation, in which a heavy work-
piece is presented to the worker. The worker install 
items, and then, the robot safely pulls the workpiece 
to the carrier. The scenario during the installation 
task is extended as the involved CPPS is 
compromised under a cyber-attack and the robot 
controller receives false signals and subsequently 
reduces the gripper force, primarily required to grip 
the heavy workpiece. The failure of operation results 
in a serious safety issue and failure of HRC. To eval-
uate the system’s vulnerabilities and appraise the 
hazard from control system failure that could be 
faced by CPPS, a simulation setup of an automated 
collaborative control of the robotic system is pre-
sented for software in the loop simulation using 
the Matlab/Simulink platform. The kinematics and 
dynamics of the manipulator are based on youBot 
Table 2. Hazards during collaboration.
From Robot From Industrial Process From robot control system malfunction
Robot characteristics, i.e. speed, force, 
torque, acceleration, momentum, and 
power.
Ergonomic design deficiency for operation and 
maintenance.
Due to operator’s (reasonable and foreseeable) misuse of 
the system.
Operator dangerous location of working 
under heavy payload robot.
Time duration of collaboration in the process. Control layer malfunction and misuse of collaborative 
system by the attacker under a cyber-attack in 
a connected environment.
End-effector and work part protrusions Transition time from collaborative operation to 
other operation.
Physical obstacles in front of active sensors used in the 
collaborative workspace. (e.g. obstacle in front of 
a camera)
Sensitivity of the parts of the operator 
body that can come in contact in case 
of collision.
Potential hazards from the industrial process (e.g. 
temperature and loose parts).
Non-provision of transition from collaborative operation to 
a manual system in case of system malfunction.
Mental stress to operator due to robot 
characteristics (e.g. speed and inertia).
Mental stress to the operator due to a collaborative 
industrial process.
Multiple workers involvement in the collaborative process.
Trajectory taken by the robot. Work material routing during the process. Due to wrong perception of industrial process completion 
by the robot.
Physical obstacles against robot 
operation.
Physical obstacles tackled by the worker in order to 
accomplish process requirement in 
a collaborative workspace.
Obstacles against unobstructed means of exiting the 
collaborative workspace at any instant.
Fast worker approach speed and robot’s 
slow reaction time.
Task complexity in a collaborative workspace. Visual obstruction for the robot in collaborative workspace 
due to the vantage point of the operator.
Tight safety distance limit in the 
collaborative workspace.
Figure 10. KUKA youBot used for pick and place task on two conveyors (Robot 2018).
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specifications from KUKA robotics (Miller 2020). The 
youBot mobile robot (see Figure 10) is composed of 
an omnidirectional base and a KUKA arm with 5 
degrees of freedom. The weight of the robot is 
5.3 kg with a payload capacity of 0.5 kg (Robot 
2018). This robot has been designed for teaching, 
research and experimentation (Krasňanský, Tóth, and 
Huertas 2013). The implemented simulink model is 
used to demonstrate a benchmark example for the 
collaborative control in CPPS and its vulnerability in 
case of a cyber attack on the EtherCAT real time 
communication for the control of manipulator 
(2020). The Simulink model of the youBot manipula-
tor is shown in Figure 11.
A) Normal operation
In a simplified scenario, the task of the collaborative 
control is coordinated with the help of two conveyors 
placed in a simulated industrial environment. The 
workflow for the simulation is sequenced in three 
steps, as shown in Figure 12. In the first step, the 
manipulator detects the box at the end of conveyor 
1. It then picks the box using a parallel gripper with 
two-fingers. Next, the controller executes a safe tra-
jectory for youBot to move from converyor 1 to 
conveyor 2. Finally, it places the box on conveyor 2 
to finish the job. The handling, gripping and holding 
of the box between the two conveyors are seen as the 
simplified representative of the actual scenario 
explained above. The participating worker in the col-
laboration is assumed to be present in/or near the 
robot working area.
The joint angles for the pivot, bicep, forearm and 
wrist are shown in Figure 13 under normal conditions. 
The finger position shown in the same figure depicts 
the gripping action of the manipulator while picking 
the box from conveyor 1 and placing it on conveyor 2. 
The radial and axial forces for all axes are shown in 
Figure 14.
B) Cyber attack scenario
The typical scenarios of cyber-attack on the collabora-
tive CPPS in an industrial setting may include man in 
the middle (MIM) attack, down sampling attack, con-
trol parameter attack or a coordinated attack, which 
maybe a combination of two or more basic attack 
mechanisms in order to disrupt the desired function-
ing of a CPPS (Wan, Canedo, and Faruque 2015; Khalid 
et al. 2018). For our case, the intruder is able to 
penetrate through the firewall and excecute 
Figure 11. Simulation model of the youBot manipulator.
Figure 12. (a)–(c) Manipulator with two conveyors for pick and place task.
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Figure 14. Manipulator radial and axial forces for pick and place task under normal conditions.
Figure 13. Manipulator joint angles and finger position for pick and place task under normal conditions.
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a control parameter attack at t = 7s, resulting in 
modification of the gripper filter time constant from 
0.1 to 1. This results in the failure of the finger position 
to maintain the grip on the box, resulting in dropping 
Figure 16. Manipulator radial and axial forces for pick and place task under cyber-attack @ t = 7s.
Figure 15. Manipulator joint angles and finger position for pick and place task under cyber-attack at t = 7s.
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the box at t = 7s, and thus, the pick and place task is 
not successful. The joint angles and finger positions 
for the cyber-attack scenario are shown in Figure 15. 
The radial and axial forces along all axes in this sce-
nario are shown in Figure 16. The maximum radial 
force of the gripper has changed to 18.53 N, which 
was previously 19.6 N under normal execution of pick 
and place operation.
As is evident from the above figures, in case of 
cyber attack resulting in malfunctioning of the control 
layer, the industrial operations may be hazardous for 
surrounding operators due to uncontrolled action of 
the robot. In our case, the manipulator missed to grip 
the box and therefore was unable to complete the 
task. A heavy payload dropped in such events can 
damage the equipment or hurt an operator within 
the collaborative robot workspace. In a worst case 
scenario, the malfunctioned manipulator or conveyor 
system could result in a total disaster for the plant.
6. Conclusion
The manuscript proposed an integrated CPPS for the 
flexible manufacturing industrial environment. The new 
definition in the CPPS includes the HC that interacts 
with other CPS components in a fully interconnected 
system with the robotic component as part of the 
futuristic manufacturing systems. In order to see the 
feasibility of the proposed system, an industrial scenario 
is selected to visulaize an industrial assembly process 
using a heavy payload robot. The technolgy selection 
phase in the CPPS revealed the real challenges that can 
seriouly encumber the HRC. The challenges are high-
lighted from the standpoint of the used robot scale, 
industrial process complexity, safety distance computa-
tion based on the existing sensor technology and the 
malfunction of the control layer in case of cyber-attacks. 
It is evident from the simulation that a security compro-
mised physical asset can cause a serious safety issue in 
the CPPS due to the high connectivity. Our prime objec-
tive is to emphasize on a flexible cooperative framework 
of hybrid team players in a CPPS to provide relief to the 
human workers in egronomoically hard jobs or injurious 
activities. Overall, it is suggested that any such design 
activity for such a HRC system must include the 
integrated concepts of safety and security. As in the 
interconnected environment, both concepts merge to 
affect the overall quality of HRC, the industrial process 
itself and the health and safety of the human operator 
working with the cobot in the context of Industry 4.0.
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